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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS REPLY BRIEF
POINT I

SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT
FOR AND BIND AMERICAN BY THE REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE AS
TO THE EFFECT OF THE AGREEMENT MARGETTS SIGNED.
Standard of Review: Actual or apparent authority of an agent involves
mixed questions of law and fact which "do not require the deference due to
findings on questions of pure fact." Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195, 1200
(Utah 1985). Deference is to be accorded to facts found by the lower court
from disputed evidence but the legal conclusions resulting from those facts are
questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d
1089, 1092 (Utah 1991). However, facts determined based on what was
considered to be reasonable are reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of
Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983).

POINT II

THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE TWENTY
PERCENT AGREEMENT MUST BE READ TOGETHER AS ONE
TRANSACTION AND ANY AMBIGUITY DETERMINED FROM THE TOTAL
TRANSACTION.
Standard of Review: Construction of several agreements together as one
agreement is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 1358 (Utah App. 1987).
Ambiguity of the agreements is an issue of law reviewed for correctness.
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Construction of extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity is a matter of fact reviewed under the clearly
I

erroneous standard, Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P.2d 279 (Utah
App. 1987), unless no regard need be given to the demeanor of witnesses and
those facts were determined based on what was considered to be reasonable.
Reasonableness is a matter of law reviewed for correctness. First Sec. Bank of
Utah v. Maxwell 659 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1983).
POINT III

THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN POINT V.A OF ITS
BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE AWARD OF RENTAL VALUE. INSTEAD
THEY SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A
JUDGMENT BASED ON UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE.
Standard of Review: Unconscionability is a matter of law reviewable for
correctness. No findings were made by the lower court on this issue but those
facts are not in dispute. Therefore, this issue is a matter of law to be reviewed
for correctness. Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991).

POINT IV

NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER STATUTE HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW AND THE
JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE REVERSED.
Standard of Review: The facts are not in dispute so whether those facts
support the claim of unlawful detainer is a question of law to be reviewed for
correctness. Asav v. Watkins. 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988).

POINT V

THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES FINDS NO SUPPORT IN
THE RECORD AND HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR FACT.
Standard of Review: Since there was no evidence introduced on the
question of attorney's fees, the propriety of the award of attorney's fees is
entirely a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Commerce Financial
v. Markwest Corp.. 806 P.2d 200, 202 (Utah App. 1990).

POINT VT

IF THE TRIER OF FACT MUST DETERMINE DAMAGES FROM THE
OPINION OF EXPERTS, PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY NOT BE
AWARDED.
Standard of Review: Correctness. Shoreline Development. Inc. v. Utah
County. 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992).
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
See Addendum to Brief of Appellant for full text of all statutes.
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IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation, successor-ininterest to AMERICAN SAVINGS
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
California corporation,
Case No. 930450-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JOHN L. MARGETTS,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Because of certain new matters, both factual and legal, raised in Appellee's Brief,
Appellant deems it necessary to respond to and clarify those matters.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant reaffirms the statement of facts in his initial brief and makes the
following clarifications or corrections to some assertions of fact made by Appellee:
1. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 3 of its brief, New
West has stated that "American Savings agreed to front the costs of reaching settlements
with the lienholders". This statement is misleading since "fronting the costs" implies that
Terrace Falls would reimburse those costs later to American. That was not the intent and
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was not done. American simply paid whatever was negotiated by its agent, Gerald Snow,
to obtain the releases from lienholders.
2. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 5 of its brief, New
West asserts that American offered Margetts a credit of $150,000 and "Margetts accepted
this offer". The fact is that Margetts refused to accept this offer and did not sign the
agreements until Snow presented the Twenty Percent Agreement and explained to Margetts
that it would give him what he wanted, that only seven condominiums had to be sold to
completely pay for his condominium and that American did not have to sign the agreement
to be bound by it because American would be Terrace Falls Condominiums. (See Statement
of Facts, 11115-8, Brief of Appellant).
3. In its Statement of Facts in the second paragraph on page 5 of its brief, New
West asserts that the "purpose of the Twenty Percent Agreement was to permit Margetts
to participate in any windfall profits the Project developers might receive after American
Savings took over the project." Besides the unbelievability of this assertion (see Brief of
Appellant, pp.29-30), that is not its purpose. That purpose is not stated in the agreement
nor did Snow state to Margetts that that was its purpose. That was only his explanation of
it long after the fact when he didn't want to be caught in the cross-fire between Margetts
and New West.
4. In its Statement of Facts in the first paragraph on page 7 of its brief, New
West asserts that Margetts was served with a Notice to Quit by certified mail in accordance
with Utah Code Ann. §§78-36-3 and 6. The evidence only shows that Margetts eventually
received a copy of the notice but not that it was served by certified mail as required by §78-
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36-6, U.C.A. nor that it complied with §78-36-3, U.C.A. The failure to comply with the
statute is crucial to New West's attempt to obtain a judgment under the unlawful detainer
statute.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I. MR. SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACT
FOR AND BIND AMERICAN TO THE TOTAL AGREEMENT.
Snow was authorized by American to act for it in obtaining a release from
Margetts. Whatever he did and represented in the course of obtaining that release is
binding on American. If actual authority was not present, the facts show that American
placed Mr. Snow in a position where all offers and communications came through him and
Margetts was justified in relying on Snow's actions and representations. American and its
successor, New West, are bound by the representations Snow made to Margetts as to the
effect of the agreement he was signing. The suggestions that Snow represented Terrace
Falls and that American was represented by other attorneys or that Snow didn't intend to
bind American are all irrelevant when, in fact, Snow carried out American's instructions.
Margetts reasonably relied upon Snow's explanations of the legal effect of the agreements.

II. THE SEPARATE AGREEMENTS, BY THEIR OWN TERMS, ARE ONE
TRANSACTION AND THEY MUST BE CONSTRUED TOGETHER.
New West's claim that the purchase agreement and the Twenty Percent
Agreement are each separately unambiguous ignores the fact that the total agreement
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includes the Twenty Percent Agreement which was the inducement for the signing of the
purchase agreement. Those agreements include terms each referring to the other. The
integration clause in the purchase agreement, by its own terms, does not exclude its
modification by the Twenty Percent Agreement and, in fact, that agreement anticipated
additional documents.

III. THE JUDGMENT FOR RENTAL VALUE IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT NOR HAVE THE ELEMENTS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
BEEN PROVEN.
AMERICAN RECEIVED THE CREDIT AND IT IS
UNCONSCIONABLE FOR NEW WEST TO RETAIN IT.
A judgment for rent must be based either on an agreement to pay rent or on
unjust enrichment. There was no agreement to pay rent and New West did not prove the
essential elements of unjust enrichment. The cases cited by New West to support an award
of rental value apply only to offset rental value against the amount to be returned to the
buyer based on unconscionable forfeiture and therefore support Margetts' position.
American received substantial value for the credit to Margetts and a nonrefundable credit
is equivalent to the forfeiture of liquidated damages.

IV. NEW WEST WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROCEED UNDER THE
UNLAWFUL DETAINER STATUTE AND THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL
DETAINER MUST BE REVERSED. NEW WEST, ITSELF, RAISED THIS ISSUE BELOW
BUT DID NOT PROVE COMPLIANCE.
New West attempted to take advantage of the Unlawful Detainer Statute,
thereby raising that issue itself, but without complying with its strict requirements. Neither
Margetts nor his wife were served with a notice to quit as required by the statute.
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Furthermore, his wife was not even joined in this action so any unlawful detainer by
Margetts caused no loss to New West because she still had the right of possession. At most,
only nominal damages could be awarded. No provision of the statute applies in this case.

V. THERE WAS NO CONTRACT, STATUTE OR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, THE BURDEN WAS ON NEW WEST TO RAISE
THIS ISSUE AND PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR IT.
An award of attorney's fees must be supported by evidence. No evidence was
submitted to the lower court. There was no statute which authorized attorney's fees and the
only contract which provided for fees was not in dispute and no judgment was obtained
under that contract. In fact, New West abandoned its claim under that contract. That
contract, the Condominium Purchase Agreement, was only in dispute if the court held the
Twenty Percent Agreement to be a part of that contract, in which event Margetts must
prevail on the merits and attorney's fees should be awarded to him.

VI. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST MAY NOT BE AWARDED IF THE TRIER
OF FACT MUST USE ITS JUDGMENT TO DETERMINE DAMAGES.
The court was required to use its judgment to determine rental value based on
the opinion of an expert. That opinion was not a fixed rule or known standard of value
which could be accepted without the exercise of judgment. The court could have chosen to
disbelieve either the opinion or the basis for the opinion.

Prejudgment interest was

improperly awarded on both the rental value and the treble damages and attorney's fees
judgment entered on remand.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
SNOW HAD BOTH ACTUAL AND APPARENT AUTHORITY
TO ACT FOR AND BIND AMERICAN BY THE
REPRESENTATIONS HE MADE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE
AGREEMENT MARGETTS SIGNED.
In arguing that Mr. Snow had neither actual nor apparent authority to bind
American to the Twenty Percent Agreement, New West, in Point II of its brief, has asserted
that Margetts failed to marshall all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends to
support the findings and to show that these same findings are so lacking in support as to be
against the clear weight of the evidence. It further claims that, "at most, Margetts can point
to bits and pieces of evidence . . . that Snow sometimes communicated American Savings'
positions . . .and that Snow sometimes delivered documents to Margetts which affected
American Savings' interests." The fact is that these bits and pieces of evidence demonstrate
that Snow communicated American's position all the time and that Snow delivered all of
American's documents to Margetts. Snow was the means by which every communication was
passed between American and Margetts.

There was no one else involved.

These

communications were the negotiations between American and Margetts which led to the
signing of the documents. Every element of the transaction was approved by American and
communicated to Margetts by Snow.
In suggesting that Margetts has not marshalled all the evidence in favor of the
findings, New West has attempted to do so by listing, on pages 11-12 of its brief, the fact
that Snow represented Terrace Falls, the fact that one letter stated that Kirton & McConkie
was American's counsel, the fact that Snow did not tell Margetts he was representing
6

American (ignoring the fact that he also did not tell him he was not representing American
[Tr. I l l ] ) , the unsupported conclusion that American never gave Snow permission to enter
into agreements on its behalf and did not see the Twenty Percent Agreement in advance,
and that Snow never ''believed" he was representing American nor "intended" to bind
American. None of these matters supports the findings of the lower court because they are
all irrelevant to the question of whether Snow actually did act on behalf of American and
was its agent. In order to demonstrate this point, let's assume the facts were even worse for
Margetts' position. Suppose American had told Snow, "You are not our agent and you must
tell everybody you meet that you are not our agent. But we must have this agreement and
this release. Go ahead and prepare those for us and we will pay your fees for doing so.
Yes, you may revise those documents as requested by Margetts. Yes, you can increase our
offer to Margetts to $50,000 and, yes, you can offer him a $150,000 credit. Remember to
tell him you are not our agent. But, this has dragged on now for too long. Just get his
release and get this matter closed." And suppose that Snow followed those instructions.
What is said by American and Snow and what each of them thinks or intends is irrelevant
if American gave Snow instructions as to how to deal with Margetts and he carried out those
instructions. Snow is the agent for American, in fact, no matter what either of them says or
thinks.
And it does not matter that Snow also represented Terrace Falls. He obviously
had more than one client and if there is a conflict, that was his problem-not Margetts'. And
it does not matter that American may also have been represented by Kirton & McConkie.
Many clients have multiple attorneys and agents. It is clear in this case that Kirton &
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McConkie did little or nothing to actually represent American. All communications were
made through Snow and Snow himself testified that, after the first meeting, "the Kirton &
McConkie firm was out of the loop'1 and he had no dealings that would indicate to him that
they were still representing American. [Tr. 100-1]. They played no part in the negotiations.
Snow did all of that. Snow may not have been acting as American's attorney in the formal
sense, but he need not be American's attorney in order to be its agent. Agency is not
limited to the attorney-client relationship.
All of the evidence that is claimed to support the lower court's finding comes
within these categories and it is all irrelevant. On the other hand, what American and Snow
did [see listing on pages 25-6, Brief of Appellant], as opposed to what they thought or said,
compels a finding of agency. Every communication was made by American through Snow
and every act of Snow had the authorization and approval of American, with the possible
exception of the representations made by Snow as to the effect of the Twenty Percent
Agreement, which were all made incidental to and in furtherance of the objective that Snow
was authorized to obtain for American and were, therefore, also binding on American.
Bowen v. Olsen, 576 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1978); Ficke v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 524 P.2d 271
(Alaska 1974).
New West asserts that it was Margetts' obligation to ascertain Snow's authority
despite any representation of Snow. That principle does not apply where the principal, in
the presence of Margetts, placed the agent in a position to speak for it. By allowing Snow
to speak for it, American placed Snow in a position of apparent, if not actual, authority to
bind it. Mr. Lee Stevens, American's representative, appeared with Snow and allowed him

8

to speak for him and to make and increase American's offer. Furthermore, under the
circumstances present at the final meeting when the documents were signed, this assertion
is contrary to reason and to the law. It was totally reasonable for Margetts to rely upon the
representations made by Snow for the reasons set forth on pages 29-30 the Brief of
Appellant. It is without dispute that Margetts had vehemently refused to sign any agreement
with American until the Twenty Percent Agreement was presented to him and he was
assured that American would be bound by it. That agreement was totally valueless if the
credit to Margetts under that agreement was to come from the insolvent partnership which
owned the project prior to its conveyance to American and both parties knew that.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that Snow was an attorney making representations as
the legal effect of what Margetts was signing and Margetts was there without an attorney.
Snow spent a couple of hours trying to persuade Margetts to sign the documents, knowing
that the whole deed-in-lieu transaction which he had negotiated with several others would
fall apart if Margetts did not sign [T. 140]. And Snow knew that Margetts was leaving town
the next day and he had to close the transaction that day. [T. 125]. It is reasonable to
assume that Snow used every argument he could to persuade Margetts to sign-in the face
of two months of absolute refusal to sign by Margetts. Margetts had no choice but to rely
on the representations of Snow. The Utah Court of Appeals, in Schuhman v. Green River
Motel 835 P.2d 992, 996 (Utah 1992) held that such a representation "was the sine gua non
which dispensed with any further inquiry" and the reliance by the defrauded parties was
justifiable. That court relied on the Utah Supreme Court's statements in Pace v. Parrish.
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273, 276-7:
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Defendants suggest that the plaintiffs had no right to rely on the
representations made by defendant, but were bound to make more
careful and complete inquiry concerning such matters. It is strange
and inconsistent for defendants to urge the necessity for the plaintiffs
to cross-examine Mr. Parrish and to doubt and verify his
representations.
As to reliance in such situations, see 5 Williston on Contracts,
Rev. Ed., Sec. 1512. The full measure of the plaintiffs' duty was to
use reasonable care and observation in connection with these
representations. Having done so, it does not lie in defendant's
mouth to say that they were too gullible and shouldn't have believed
him.
It was entirely reasonable for Margetts to rely on the statements of Snow, as an attorney,
as to the legal effect of the documents he was signing. Further inquiry was not only not
required, it was not available to Margetts at the time. Snow told Margetts the matter must
be closed that day and Margetts' attorney was not available to him that day. He relied
totally upon the only attorney who was there to explain the matter to him.

POINT II
THE CONDOMINIUM PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND THE
TWENTY PERCENT AGREEMENT MUST BE READ TOGETHER
AS ONE TRANSACTION AND ANY AMBIGUITY DETERMINED
FROM THE TOTAL TRANSACTION.
New West has argued that the Condominium Purchase Agreement and the
Twenty Percent Agreement are each clear and unambiguous and that the court should not
resort to extrinsic evidence to interpret them. This argument misses the whole point that
these agreements were signed together, at the same time and as a part of the same
transaction, and must be construed together. That argument also implies the admission,
made in New West's brief on the prior appeal, that the two agreements when construed
10

together are ambiguous. In fact, while the Purchase Agreement does not refer to the
Twenty Percent Agreement, since it was prepared earlier, the Twenty Percent Agreement
recites that it is in "consideration of and as further inducement to . . . the Condominium
Purchase Agreement, Request for Reconveyance and General Release" and "that except to
the extent this Agreement may be construed as inconsistent with or as a modification of the
aforesaid General Release, in which case this Agreement shall prevail." This language
makes it obvious that they were part of the same transaction and must be construed
together.
The presence of an integration clause in the Condominium Purchase Agreement
does not change this fact since that clause expressly applies only to "prior understandings
and agreements" and not to any subsequent understandings and agreements. [Ex. 7, H 18].
Furthermore, that clause is preceded by another provision by which
the parties hereby agree to execute and deliver such additional
documents and to take such further action as may become necessary
or desirable to fully carry out the provisions and intent of this
Agreement.
Subsequent documents were not only anticipated by the Purchase Agreement, but expected
and perhaps required.
The agreements, by their own terms, must be read together and any ambiguity
assessed as to the total agreement and not separately as desired by New West.
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POINT III
THE CASES RELIED UPON BY NEW WEST IN POINT V.A
OF ITS BRIEF DO NOT SUPPORT THE AWARD OF RENTAL
VALUE. INSTEAD THEY SUPPORT MARGETTS' POSITION
THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT BASED ON
UNCONSCIONABLE FORFEITURE.
New West admits there was no contract to pay rent between Margetts and
American. Its argument in favor of the award of rental value is now based on cases
involving the forfeiture of real property sales contracts or unjust enrichment. New West did
not make any such claims in its pleadings nor at the trial and the lower court did not make
any findings which would support such claims. New West has cited Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d
1082 (Utah 1983), and Abrams v. Financial Service Co., 13 U.2d 343, 374 P.2d 309 (1962),
as support for this award. These cases both involve claims, based on unconscionable
forfeiture, for the return of payments made by defaulting buyers after the termination of
their contracts, in which rental value is considered as one element of the seller's actual
damages which may be offset against the amount to be returned to the buyer. Neither case
involves a claim by the seller for the rental value in a suit to recover the property, as is the
case here. Those cases have application only where the seller has received more under the
contract than his actual damages. They, therefore, support the argument made by Margetts
in Point IV of his Brief of Appellant.
Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201, 687 P.2d 591 (1984), also cited by New West,
involves a home purchase contract which was actually closed and performed. Rental value
for the use of the home prior to closing was not allowed in that case. The opinion, by way
of dictum, would have allowed rental value in the case of disaffirmance of the contract by
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the buyer. That, of course, is not the case here where Margetts was attempting to enforce
the agreement to obtain the condominium and the question before the court was what
constituted that agreement. New West's assertion that Margetts "repudiated" the agreement
and the lower court's conclusion of law using that term are not supported by the facts. Yes,
Margetts failed to close on the terms demanded by New West but he continued to insist that
New West close according to his interpretation of the agreement. Once the court adopts
New West's view of the agreement, that may be a breach on Margetts' part but it is not a
repudiation. He was, and still is, attempting to enforce the agreement. He has never
repudiated it. Therefore, any claim for damages based on repudiation does not apply.
Alternatively, New West attempts to justify the award of rental value on the basis
of unjust enrichment and cites Knight v. Post 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1988), as support for that
position. In fact, that case held that unjust enrichment did not apply just because a benefit
was conferred upon a party in the absence of some misleading act by that party. The court,
at 1099, quoted from Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 774
(Utah 1977):
There must be some misleading act, request for services, or the like,
to support such an action. Mere failure of performance by one of
the contracting parties does not give rise to a right of restitution.
There is no finding in this case of a misleading act, request for services, or the like, on the
part of Margetts, nor any evidence from which such a finding could be made. Furthermore,
Marshall v. Bare, supra, at 595, the case which New West claims supports its position,
expressly held that "recovery for unjust enrichment cannot be awarded where, as here, there
was an enforceable express contract covering the same subject matter." That has also been
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the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 576,
578 (Utah 1992). The existence of the Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New West
elected not to enforce, precludes any application of unjust enrichment.
In Point V.B of its brief, New West concedes the principle of unconscionable
forfeiture as established in the cases cited in Point IV of the Brief of Appellant. But it
claims that principle does not apply because the $150,000 credit "did not represent funds
actually paid to American". New West then claims that the credit "simply represented a
concession on the purchase price of the unit in consideration of the release of Margetts'
junior lien" which allowed New West "to avoid the complications of a formal foreclosure".
This is an admission by New West that the release of Margetts' lien had substantial value
to American, a value of $150,000! American avoided not only the complications of a formal
foreclosure, but also the substantial costs of a foreclosure as well as the prospects of a
lengthy and expensive Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the adverse effect of a foreclosure or
bankruptcy on the value of the property. [Tr. 41]. That was the same as putting cash into
American's pocket and American realized that when it agreed to a credit of $150,000.
Remember that Margetts actually lost over $300,000 when he entered into the purchase
agreement but American was only willing to credit him with $150,000 of that amount
because that was what it was worth to American. This consideration to American was no
different than it would have been if Margetts had actually conveyed another parcel of
property to American as a down payment on the agreement which both parties agreed had
a value of $150,000. This agreed value of this other property would represent a "credit"
against the purchase price in the same sense that the agreed value of the avoidance of the
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costs and complications of a foreclosure represents a credit. Margetts gave up substantial
value and American received substantial value. By taking the condominium back, New West
received this $150,000 in value from Margetts leaving him with nothing.

The

unconscionability of this is present whether that value was in cash or other items of value.
New West places some emphasis on the wording of the Condominium Purchase
Agreement that the credit was "nonrefundable".

Despite the fact that the Settlement

Agreement, which was signed at the same time and as a part of the same transaction, does
not so qualify the credit [See Ex. 6, 11 2], this word does not render this agreement any
different from the Uniform Real Estate Contracts and other contracts, which were the
subject of all the cases cited in Point IV of the Brief of Appellant, which provide that "all
payments which have been made theretofore on this contract by the Buyer, shall be forfeited
to the Seller as liquidated damages." [II16A, Uniform Real Estate Contract, Addendum; see
also Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1083 (Utah 1983)]. Forfeiture as liquidated damages and
nonrefundability are equivalent.
An unconscionable forfeiture is clearly present in this case and that requires that
Margetts be given judgment for the $159,234 offset by the rental value of $17,100 resulting
in a net judgment of $142,134.
POINT IV
NEW WEST'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER STATUTE HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED BELOW
AND THE JUDGMENT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER MUST BE
REVERSED.
New West has claimed, in Point VI of its brief, that compliance with the
Unlawful Detainer Statute was not properly raised below. This assertion is surprising in view
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of the fact that New West specifically sought relief for unlawful detainer in its complaint and
the allegations of that complaint were denied in Margetts' answer. That placed this issue
of compliance with the Unlawful Detainer Statute directly before the court and was the basis
of the New West's entire case, since it abandoned its alternative claim for performance of
the agreement (R.538, p. 154; R.539, p.334). The lower court could not properly have
granted a judgment in favor of New West without considering its compliance with the
Unlawful Detainer Statute under which it sought relief. New West had the burden of
establishing every element of unlawful detainer. No objections by Margetts were necessary.
Margetts, both in the lower court and now, of course objects that New West failed to carry
its burden with respect to those elements.
The assertion, on page 29 of Appellee's Brief, that Margetts failed to assert that
a Notice to Quit was improperly served is also not true. Margetts admitted to having
received a notice to quit but denied all other allegations with respect thereto [Answer, 11 11,
R. 27-51]. That constitutes a denial rather than an admission that the Notice to Quit was
properly served as required by the statute. Strict compliance with that statute is the essence
of an unlawful detainer action and the burden is on New West to prove that it has fully
complied. That applies to the form of the notice, American Holding Co. v. Hanson, 23 U.2d
432, 464 P.2d 592 (1970), as well as to the service of the notice, Carstensen v. Hansen, 107
Utah 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944). New West's admission that it failed to offer any evidence
on this matter [Brief of Appellee, p.29] deprives it of any right to proceed in unlawful
detainer. In Carstensen, the mailing of a notice to quit was held to be insufficient because
it did not comply with the statute. The court stated, at 955:
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There could be no need to detail certain explicit methods of service
if any method will do. . . . "Under statutes like this, it is not the fact
that the party to be notified has actual knowledge of the fact, but it
is proof that it has been conveyed to him in the prescribed method,
that gives right of action. . . . The statutory method, once broken
through, would open wide the gates for vicious precedents, which
rapidly multiply, and too often, in the end, practically nullify the will
of the legislature." [quoting Hyde v. Goldsby, 25 Mo. App. 29]
[Emphasis supplied].
Since the decision in that case, the statute has been amended to allow service
of the notice by registered or certified mail, §78-36-6(2), U.C.A., but not by regular mail.
New West has not met its burden of proof to show that it is entitled to proceed under the
Unlawful Detainer Statute. Service by regular mail and actual notice by any method, other
than those prescribed by the statute, is simply not sufficient to place one in unlawful
detainer. Other remedies were available to New West to obtain possession of the property
without the necessity of following the strict requirements of the Unlawful Detainer Statute,
but if it wants the benefits of the summary procedure, it must follow the steps outlined
therein. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion).
New West argues that its failure to serve Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit was
not raised in Margetts' Answer. This, too, is an essential element of the cause of action
which New West has the burden to prove. Its failure to do so is fatal to its claim for
damages for unlawful detainer. It claims that the "unlawful detainer statute does not require
that all occupants be personally handed a copy of the Notice to Quit." (Brief of Appellee,
p.29). The statute does, however, require that the notice be served in one of the four ways
listed in §78-36-6, U.C.A., one of which is handing the notice to the tenant personally. Mrs.
Margetts was not served with a notice at all, let alone in one of the way prescribed by the
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statute. The fact that the notice may have included language that it was intended for
"occupants of the premises" (it was not "addressed" to the occupants, as claimed by New
West) has no legal effect if the notice is not served on those occupants as required by
statute. Furthermore, as has already been pointed out, even if Mrs. Margetts had been
properly served with the notice, she was not joined as a party to the action so any judgment
could not be effective against her. New West has not suffered any damages as a result of
Mr. Margetts' occupancy of the property and the judgment for $21,600 for unlawful detainer
must be reversed.
In addition to New West's problems with failure to properly serve either Mr. or
Mrs. Margetts with a notice to quit, it has not shown how it is entitled to proceed under the
Unlawful Detainer Statute at all. As pointed out in the Brief of Appellant, pp.40-41, New
West is not entitled to proceed under §78-36-3(l)(b), U.C.A., because there was no lease
of the property for "an indefinite time with monthly or other periodic rent reserved". New
West apparently admits that in its brief by making no argument to that effect but now claims
it complied with subsection (a) or (e). But subsection (a) does not apply because there was
no contract, express or implied, letting the property to Margetts for a "specified term or
period". There was neither a "letting" of the property nor a "specified term or period". This
is the holding of the case relied upon by New West. Marshall v. Bare, supra, at 595, quotes
from 77 AmJur. VENDOR AND PURCHASER, §324, as follows:
It is generally held that since the relation of landlord and tenant in
its proper sense does not exist between a vendee and his vendor
when the vendee enters under the contract to purchase with the
permission of the vendor, no promise on the part of the vendee to
pay for the use and occupation will be implied.
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Likewise, §78-36-3(l)(e), U.C.A. does not apply. That provision requires the
service of a notice giving the tenant the alternatives of performing, after default, a condition
or covenant of the lease under which the property is held or of surrendering the property.
That provision does not apply in this case since there was no lease or agreement under
which the property was held and no alternative to perform or surrender was given in the
notice. That such an alternative must be given as one of the strict requirements of the
statute was the holding of American Holding Co., supra, at 592, with respect to the similar
alternative notice required by §78-36-3(l)(c).
This does not leave New West without a remedy since it always had the nonsummary remedies that existed at common law prior to and after the adoption of the
Unlawful Detainer Statute. American Holding Co., supra at 593-5 (concurring opinion.
New West was simply not in a position to sue under the Unlawful Detainer Statute. The
judgment for unlawful detainer must be reversed.

POINT V
THE JUDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES FINDS NO
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD AND HAS NO BASIS IN LAW OR
FACT.
New West has again argued, on page 29 of its brief, that the issue of attorney's
fees was not raised in the lower court because, "at trial, Margetts' counsel requested a
special hearing for the prevailing party to present attorney's fees." How that conclusion
follows from the stated premise is difficult to understand. Yes, Margetts' counsel did suggest
that attorney's fees be considered at a separate hearing but no such hearing was held and
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no evidence as to attorney's fees was ever presented. Since New West was the prevailing
party, the burden was on it to schedule such a hearing and to present its evidence as to fees.
There was nothing upon which the court could make a determination as to reasonableness
of fees. See Commerce Financial v. Markwest Corp., 806 P.2d 200 (Utah App. 1990), in
which the court stated, at 204:
. . . a party seeking attorney fees must support its claim in the trial
court with evidence of their amount and reasonableness. . . .
. . . . Since C.F. failed completely in its attorney fee proof, we
conclude that, on the evidence presented, the trial court did not err
in denying attorney fees to C.F.
That case further held that if the action involved several claims, some of which were based
on a contract providing for fees and some of which were not, the failure to apportion the
fees would alone be sufficient basis for the trial court's denial of attorney's fees. That
principle is also involved in this case since a portion of New West's claim was based on a
contract, which it abandoned (see Brief of Appellant p. 45), and a portion was based on an
allegation of unlawful detainer. The failure to apportion the fees means that there could
be no determination as to what amount applied to the successful claim. Without that
determination the judgment cannot stand.
This suit did not result from Margetts' refusal to perform the Condominium
Agreement, as claimed by New West. It resulted from New West's refusal to recognize
Margetts' contention that the Twenty Percent Agreement entitled him to a credit with which
he could complete his purchase of the condominium. Margetts wanted the condominium.
He didn't refuse to buy it. The dispute in this matter was entirely over the Twenty Percent
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Agreement and New West's demand for possession. Neither of those matters entitles New
West to attorney's fees.
POINT VI
IF THE TRIER OF FACT MUST DETERMINE DAMAGES
FROM THE OPINION OF EXPERTS, PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST MAY NOT BE AWARDED.
New West misreads the cases when it claims that the fixing of a loss at a
particular time allows an award of prejudgment interest on that loss. The standard is
whether the trier of fact must use its best judgment in assessing the damages rather than
follow fixed rules and known standards of value. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d
414, 422 (Utah 1989). In this case, the opinion of an expert was required to establish rental
value. The trier of fact could have chosen to disbelieve that expert or to disregard the basis
for his opinion. That opinion was not, in any sense, a "fixed rule" or a "known standard of
value". The trier of fact was required to use its best judgment to determine the rental value.
This Court recently held similarly in Anesthesiologists Assoc, v. St. Benedict's Hospital 852
P.2d 1030, 1042 (Utah App. 1993), in refusing to award prejudgment interest on lost profits
based upon the uncontradicted testimony of an expert. The Court stated:
Despite the fact that Associates' expert used sound mathematical
methods in arriving at his damages estimate, he did not use the only
possible method, nor did he measure the damages against a fixed
standard. The factfinder in this case had to assess expert testimony
and apply its best judgment to determine a fair amount for lost
profits. While the expert's estimates were a reliable enough basis for
awarding damages, the assumptions used to arrive at those estimates
are by no means the only way to arrive at Associates' damages.
Prejudgment interest was not justified in this case. New West has not addressed
Margetts' challenge to the award of prejudgment interest on the entire amount of the new
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judgment. Like rental value, treble damages for unlawful detainer and attorney's fees are
not subject to calculation in advance by mathematical certainty and cannot support
prejudgment interest. That portion of the judgment must also be overturned.

CONCLUSION
The dispute in this case is over the entire agreement between the parties, which
includes the Twenty Percent Agreement, which was signed at the same time and as a part
of the entire transaction and was the inducement for the signing of the other documents.
The inconsistencies and ambiguities among those documents allow the consideration of
extrinsic evidence to interpret them and require that the entire agreement be held
unenforceable and void unless Margetts' view of those documents, as represented to him by
Mr. Snow, be adopted. That is the only view that makes any sense under the circumstances.
Mr. Snow was authorized directly by American to negotiate for a release from
Margetts and, therefore, had actual authority to bind American by his actions and
representations in obtaining that release. Furthermore, by placing Mr. Snow in a position
to speak for it and making all communications to Margetts through Mr. Snow, American
clothed Mr. Snow with apparent authority to act for and bind it and Margetts was justified
in relying on the statements made by Mr. Snow.
There was no occupancy agreement upon which the court could base its award
of rental value and the essential elements of unjust enrichment have not been established.
In particular, New West has failed to show that it was inequitable for Margetts to retain the
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benefit of occupancy of the condominium, especially in light of the fact that New West
retained the condominium that Margetts had paid for and did not receive.
Instead of pursuing one of the normal remedies available to it to obtain
possession of the condominium, New West attempted to utilize the summary procedures of
the Unlawful Detainer Statute but without complying with the strict requirements of that
statute. The award of damages under that statute was, therefore, improper and must be
reversed.
The judgment for attorney's fees must also be reversed because there is no
statute or contract which authorizes such an award and there was no evidence before the
court upon which an award of fees could be based. The only possible justification for an
award of attorney's fees would require the court to hold that the Twenty Percent Agreement,
the subject of the dispute in this case, was a part of the Condominium Purchase Agreement
which authorizes an award of fees and, therefore, Margetts' view of the whole agreement
would be adopted and judgment must be entered in his favor on the merits as well as to
attorney's fees.
The entire judgment should be reversed and judgment entered in favor of
Margetts rescinding the transaction and reinstating his lien, awarding him ownership of the
condominium, or damages, and his costs and fees. In the alternative, a judgment should be
awarded to Margetts in the amount of $142,134 for the unconscionable forfeiture. In any
event, the judgment in favor of New West must be reversed.
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UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT
'This is a legally binding form, if not understood, seek competent advice."
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this

day of

by and between

_

hereinafter designated as the Seller, and

_—.———

__

—

, A. D., 19

.

——————

hereinafter designated as the Buyer, of .
2.. WITNESSETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer,
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate in
the county of

, State of Utah, to-wit:

More particularly described as follows:

3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession and pay for said described premises the sum of .
Dollars ($
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order

.—-—.——

strictly within the following times, to-wit:

—

cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $

Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the

.

($

)

shall be paid as follows:

day of

, 19

.

4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of the
principal. Interest shall be charged from

on all unpaid portions of the

purchase price at the rate of
per cent (
%) per annum. The Buyer, at his option at anytime,
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principal or in prepayment of future
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made.
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less than according
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller.
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligation against said property in favor of
. with an unpaid balance of
_, as of
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said premises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said property, except the following
,
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said property of not to exceed the
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed

percent

(
Vo) per annum and payable in regular monthly installments; provided that the aggregate monthly installment
payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be
made by the Buyer under this contract. When the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property
subject to said loans and mortgages.
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obligations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer.
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount so received upon
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and pay one-half the expenses necessary in obtaining said loan, the Seller agreeing to pay the other one-half, provided however, that the monthly payments and
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and interest rate as outlined above.
11. The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and nature which are or which may be assessed
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller hereby covenants and agrees
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following:

The Seller further covenants an 1 agrees that he will not default in the payment of his obligations against said property
12 The Buyei agiees to p ly the general taxes after
13 The Buyer further agrees to keep all insuiable build ngs and improvements on said premises insured in a com
pany acceptable to the Seller in the amount of not less than the unpaid balance on this contract or $
and to assign said msuiance to the Sellei a hi interests m ly appear a n ! to delivu the insuiance policy to him
14 In the event the Buyei snail defiult in tne payment oi any special or genei t taxes assessments oi insurance
premiums as heiein provided the Se lerr may at his option pay said taxes assessments and in urance piemiums or either
of them and if Sellei elects so to do l en the Buyei agrees to lepay the Seller upor donnnd all such sums so advanced
and paid by him, cogethei with lnteies*- thereon iiom date of payment of said sums at the rate ot & of one percent per
month until paid
15 Buver agrees that he will not commit oi suffer to be committed any v aste poil or destruction in or upon
said premises and that he will maintun said prer lses in good condition
16 In the event of a failure to comply with the terms heieof by the Buyer, or upon failure of the Buyer to make
any payment or payments when the STTC shall become lue or within
days thereafter the
Seller at his option shall have the (Al w n g alternati c remedies
A Seller shall have the light upon failure of the Buyer to lemedy the default within five days after written notice
to be iclcat>ed hom all obligations in law and in equity to convey s ud pioperty and all payments which ha\e
been made theietoioic on this ontract by the Buyer shal be foifeited to the Seller as liquidated damages for
the non peifjimance of Uic contiaet and the Buver agrees that thr Seller may at his option le enter and take
posaessioi of s n l piemises without legal processes as in its first and former estate, together with all impiove
ments md additions made bv th*. Buyei thereon and the said additions and improvements shall lemain with
the land and become the property of the Seller the Buver becoming at once a tenant at will of the bellei or
B The Si.Uei may bung suit and recover judgement for all delinquent installments including costs and attorneys
fees (The use of this remedy on one or more occasions shall not prevent the Seller at his option from resorting
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default) or
C The Seller shall have the light at his option and upon wntten notice to the Buyer to declare the entire unpaid
balance hereunder at once due and payable and may elect to treat this contract as a note an I mortage and pass
title to the Buver subject thereto and proceed immediately to foreclose the same in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah an I have the propcity sold and the pioceeds applied to the payment of the balance owing
including costs and attorney s fees and the Seller miv have a judgement for anv deficiency which mav remain
In the ease of toieclosure the Seller hcicundcr upon the filing of i complaint hall be immediately entitled to
the appointment of a icceiver to takr possession of said mortgaged property and collect the rents issues and
profits therefiom and apply the same to the payment
of the obligation hereunder or hold the same pursuant
to order of the court and the Sellei upon entry o f ju Igment of foreclosure shall be entitled to the possession
of the said premises dunng the period of redemption
17 It is agreed that time i» the essence of this agreement
18 In the event theie are anv 1 ens oi encumbrances against sail premise-, other than those herein provided for or
referred to oi in the event anv hens oi encumbrances othci than herein provided for shall heieafter accrue against the
same bv acts or neglect of the Seller then the Buver mav at his option pay and discharge the same and receive credit
on the amount then remaining due heieunder in the amount of any such payment or payments and thereafter the pay
ments herein provided to be made may at tne option of the B lyei be suspended until such a time as such suspended
payments shall equal any sums advance i as afoiesaid
19 The Seller on receiving the pavments herein reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner above mentioned
agrees to execute and deliver to the Buyei oi assigns a goo I and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to the
above described premise** flee and clear of all en« umbrances except as herein mentioned and except as may have accrued
by or through the acts or nejjcct of the Buver and to furnish at his expense a policy of title insurance in the amount
of the purchase price or at the option of the Seller an abstiact brought
to late at time of sale or at any time during the
term of this agreement or at time ot delivery of deed at the opfion of Buyer
c
20 It i hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the Buyer accepts the said property
in its present condition and that theit >xre no representations covenants or agreements between the parties hereto with
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached hereto
21 The Buyer and Seller each agiee that should they default in any of the covenants or agreements contained here
in, that the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses including a reasonable attorney s fee which may arise
or accrue from enforcing this agreen cut, or in obtaining possession of the premises covered hereby or in pursuing anv
remedv provided heicunner or bv the statutes of the State of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit
or otherwise
22 It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid are to apply to and bind the heirs executors administrator, sue
cessors and assigns of the respective parties hereto
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the sa'd parties to this agreement have hereunto signed their names the day and year
first above written
Signed in the presence of

Seller

Buyer
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